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Court could be tempted to repeat, mutatis mutandis, what it had said in the Mox Plant
litigation, namely the prohibition to submit instruments of EU law to an Arbitral
Tribunal to which the EU is not a party for purposes of their interpretation and
application.56 The stalemate would then be complete.
E. Conclusion
The EU may well be proud of its leadership in carbon emission abating policy. Some
facts should however not be forgotten. Civil aviation still accounts for only 2 per cent of
all carbon emissions worldwide, even if the percentage is rapidly increasing. For the
sake of comparison, the light-duty vehicles and the high-duty vehicles sectors are
responsible for respectively 8 per cent and 6 per cent of all European carbon emissions,
but here the EU Commission has just started to consider a comprehensive strategy on
how to tackle the issue.57 The Commission’s slow pace does not come as a surprise,
given the traditional extraordinary eﬀectual lobbying power of this strategically
important economic sector in the EU.
The suspicion inexorably arises that through Directive 2008/101the EU Commission
just wanted to set an example selecting the transport sector, in which the publicity eﬀect
of such measures and the favourable reaction of domestic constituencies would be
maximized as compared to the costs to the European economy. The increased costs
sustained by the aircraft operators will most probably be passed over to the passengers
anyway, meaning an average increase of ﬂight tickets from 2 to 10 euros depending on
the distance of the ﬂight. If that will prove a severe enough incentive to meaningfully
abate emissions in a foreseeable future is more than doubtful.
By obediently endorsing the validity of Directive 2008/101, the Court might have
thought to both contribute to the noble cause of climate change mitigation and to
reaﬃrm the supremacy of EU law. Possibly, it will not reach either of the two goals.
ANDREA GATTINI*
COMPETITION LAW
The period under review (January 2010 – June 2012) has been a time of consolidation
(or exhaustion) for the Union generally, as the Lisbon changes are allowed to bed in.
thriving force in rendering Directive 2008/101 as strict as possible with regard to extra-European
aircraft operators; see Havel and Mulligan (n 3) 6.
56 Case C-459/03, Commission of the European Communities v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635,
paras 151–152.
57 Succinct, but none the less telling information available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/transport/vehicles/heavy/index_en.htm> .
* Professor of International Law, University of Padova, andrea.gattini@unipd.it. The author
wishes to thank Prof. Richard Buxbaum and David Caron as well as the participants at a seminar
held in April 2012 at the Boalt Hall, Berkeley Law School, for their helpful comments on a
previous draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
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The competition sphere is no exception. There has been limited initiative, certainly
nothing ambitious to come out of the Commission over the period. At the same time a
new Commission took up oﬃce—three months late, and by a little-remarked
constitutional sleight of hand1—in 2010, and with it came a new Commissioner for
Competition (Mr Almunia) and with him a new Director-General of DG Competition
(Mr Italianer—Dutch notwithstanding the name), which event sometimes, but not
always, marks a reorientation of Union competition policy. Both are economists which,
again, may or may not inﬂuence the direction of policy. At the same time the Union has
been buﬀeted by a ﬁnancial crisis not wholly of its own making in which the
competition rules must have a signiﬁcant role to play.
A. The Economic Crisis
Having in the early days of the crisis remained on the sidelines, in October 2008 the
Ecoﬁn Council resolved that a common Union response to the economic crisis was
necessary2 and a month later Mrs Kroes, then Commissioner for Competition, declared
the crisis to be ‘systemic’ and that adherence to the competition rules was ‘part of the
solution, not part of the problem’.3 In particular, the integrity of the internal market
required to be re-entrenched and protected. This could, and should, be prosecuted on a
number of fronts.
1. Article 101
The Commission has not always set itself resolutely against crisis cartels, or ‘industrial
restructuring agreements’ marked by eﬀorts to reduce production capacity in a crisis
industry: it had in the past smiled upon them occasionally, ﬁnding infringement of
Article 101 but granting an exemption under Article 101(3).4 Similar generosity could
be a ﬂexible means of allowing ﬁrms in diﬃculty to cope with the fallout of the crisis
and the credit squeeze. But more recently the Court of Justice found a crisis cartel in the
Irish beef market to be a restriction of competition by object.5 This does not mean that
Article 101(3)—a matter no longer exclusively for the Commission—cannot apply,6 but
it makes it all the more diﬃcult. The Commission moved to submit amicus curiae
1 The Union was bound by primary (Treaty) law to appoint a new Commission by 31 October
2009 (2003 Act of Accession, art 45(2)(b)). But political events in ﬂux owing to the last minute
ﬂurry of Lisbon ratiﬁcations it failed to do so, the existing Commission simply staying in oﬃce, by
grace, it claimed, of a principle of continuity of public service, competent to ‘deal with current
business’ (expédier des aﬀaires courantes). The (fortuitous?) delay allowed the new Commission
to be appointed (in February 2010) in accordance with the new (Lisbon) procedure prescribed for
the 2009–14 term of oﬃce and not by the immediately previous scheme which would have required
cutting the number of Commissioners (Protocol [annexed to the pre-Lisbon TEU, the EC and
Euratom Treaties] on the Enlargement of the European Union, art 4(2)–(3)) contrary to promises
made—without Treaty authority—by the heads of state and government (Brussels European
Council, 11/12 December 2008, Presidency Conclusions, Bulletin EU 12-2008, p 8, para I.4.2) to
the Irish in order to coax them into voting ‘yes’ in the second Lisbon referendum.
2 Ecoﬁn Council of 7 October 2008, Conclusions, Council Doc 13930/08.
3 Memo/08/757.
4 Decision 84/380 (Synthetic Fibres) OJ 1984 L207/17; Decision 94/296 (Stichting Baaksten)
OJ 1994 L131/15.
5 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society and anor [2008]
ECR I-8637.
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observations under Article 15(2) of Regulation 1/20037 to the Irish High Court when it
was considering the issue of Article 101(3) justiﬁcation8 and it has indicated general
lack of enthusiasm elsewhere.9 It appears that undertakings seeking mutual
accommodation from the crisis may expect limited respite from the Commission in
the context of Article 101.
However, it does appear to be easing up in the ferocity of its ﬁnes in competition
matters. It is true that the third, sixth and seventh heaviest cartel ﬁnes ever imposed by
the Commission—in, respectively, the air freight cartel (E799.4 million),10 the liquid
crystal display (LCD) panels cartel, involving exclusively Korean and Taiwanese ﬁrms
(E648.9 million),11 and the bathroom ﬁttings cartel (E622.3 million)12—were imposed
in 2010. But these were egregious cartels and matters already in the pipeline. Total
cartel ﬁnes were annually, from 2006 to 2010, E1,850 million, E3,340 million, E2,238
million, E1,540 million and E3,056 million. In 2011 they were (merely) some E614
million and E372 million in the ﬁrst half of 2012. Whilst this is not to anticipate
gentleness in the Google case, not a cartel but an Article 102 investigation, for, it is
claimed, lowering the ranking of competing services in its search engine results and
imposing exclusivity obligations upon its advertising partners,13 and which, if the
infringement is made out, could put all previous ﬁnes in the shade, it seems clear that the
Commission’s avarice is diminishing. Whether this marks a sensitivity to the economic
crisis, or Mr Almunia is of gentler disposition than Mrs Kroes, or it is merely a
coincidence is diﬃcult to say. Certainly inability to pay (‘ITP’) is recognized as a
ground to be taken into account by the Commission in ‘exceptional cases’ in setting
a ﬁne,14 and although Mr Italianer has recently conﬁrmed that ﬁnes ‘should be
punitive’15 it seems the Commission is taking some note of the hard times we are in.
6 See the opinion of A-G Trstenjak who suggests (at para 86) that production levies limited in
time (to one year) ‘may possibly be taken into account under Article [101](3)’.
7 Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L1/1.
8 The Supreme Court accepted the Court of Justice ﬁnding that the agreement was one which
distorted competition by object but remitted the case back to the High Court to hear argument on
whether art 101(3) was joined: Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society and
anor [2009] IESC 72, [2010] 1 IR 767. The BIDS eventually withdrew its claim and the High
Court entered judgment for the Competition Authority in January 2011.
9 See the Commission submission to the OECD in the latter’s Global Forum on Competition:
Crisis Cartels, DAF/COMP/GF(2011)11, pp 112-120.
10 Case COMP/39.258, decision of 9 November 2010; under review as Cases T-36 etc/11
Japanese Air Lines and ors v Commission, pending.
11 Case COMP/39.309, decision of 8 December 2010; under review as Cases T-91 etc/11
Chimei InnoLux Corp and ors v Commission, pending.
12 Case COMP/39.092, decision of 23 June 2010; under review as Cases T-362 etc/10 Duravit
and ors v Commission, pending.
13 Cases COMP/39.740 (Foundem/Google), COMP/39.768 (Ciao/Google) and COMP/39.775
(1plusV/Google); investigation initiated in November 2010.
14 See Guidelines on the method of setting ﬁnes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of
Regulation No 1/2003, OJ 2006 C210/2, point 35. Case COMP/38.866 (Animal feed phosphates
cartel), OJ 2011 C111/19 (summary publication).
15 Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht Conference, Brussels, 14 March 2012, Recent
Developments regarding the Commission’s cartel enforcement, p 3.
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2. Mergers
The ﬁrst merger prohibited by the Commission under the new (2004) merger
regulation16 was the proposed acquisition of Aer Lingus by Ryanair in 2007.17 There
have now been two more:
. a proposed merger consisting in the acquisition by the owners of Aegean Airlines of
majority control of Olympic Airways, which would have led to a ‘quasi-monopoly’
in the markets for ﬂights between Athens and Thessaloniki and between Athens and
eight island airports.18 This was not dissimilar to the issues raised, mutatis mutandis,
in Ryanair/Aer Lingus, but it cannot be taken as natural Commission antipathy to
airline mergers, for six months prior to Olympic/Aegean it approved the merger (into
the International Airlines Group) of British Airways and Iberia,19 and a year later it
allowed IAG to acquire British Midlands (from Lufthansa),20 albeit at the cost of a
quarter of BMI’s London slots and access of some of BA’s competitors to its network
of internal connecting ﬂights from Heathrow.21
. a merger of Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext which would create another quasi-
monopoly in the area of European ﬁnancial derivatives traded globally on exchanges,
the two taken together controlling more than 90 per cent of global trade in these
products and no new market entry likely.22
The prohibition of three mergers since the new merger regulation entered into force in
2004 and 22 in total since the start in 1990 suggests a light touch, and one not
perceptibly altered since the onset of the economic crisis, in which a failing ﬁrm criteria
might be expected to attract greater sympathy. But this is of course heavily misleading,
for most contentious mergers are cleared by the Commission only with conditions
(‘commitments’).23 The Commission views commitments as an important part of its
merger control armoury, for there is in Union law no post-merger control save for
enforcing compliance with commitments made, or the general application of Article
102. Parties to a merger are of course aware of this, so frequently oﬀering remedies at an
early stage of discussion so that problems are pre-empted. In other words, the 22
prohibitions are only the tip of the merger iceberg.
Whilst having nothing to do with the economic crisis, it is worth noting that although
Germany has long championed the dominance test in merger control, in Spring 2012
the federal government proposed the adoption instead of the ‘signiﬁcant impediment
to eﬀective competition’ (SIEC) test.24 The proposal was welcomed by the
16 Regulation 139/2004 OJ 2004 L24/1.
17 Case COMP/M.4439 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus), OJ 2008 C47/9 (summary publication). A
subsequent petition by Aer Lingus inviting the Commission to require Ryanair, under art 8(4) of
Regulation 139/2004, to divest its existing control of Aer Lingus (some 30 per cent of shares) was
rejected by the Commission (Decision C(2007) 4600 of 11 October 2007, unpublished), the refusal
upheld by the General Court in Case T-411/07 Aer Lingus v Commission [2010] ECR II-3691.
18 Case COMP/M.5830, decision of 26 January 2011, not yet published.
19 Case COMP/M.5747, decision of 14 July 2010, not yet published.
20 Case COMP/M.6447, decision of 30 March 2012, not yet published.
21 For the (extensive) commitments see pp 164–95.
22 Case COMP/M.6166, decision of 1 February 2012, not yet published.
23 Of 147 mergers cleared following a phase 2 investigation (that is, where a proposed merger
‘raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market’; Regulation 139/2004, art
6(1)(c)) to June 2012, 96 required commitments.
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Bundeskartellamt25 and is, at the time of writing, before the Bundestag. If adopted it
will bring German law tightly into line with Union law. The holdouts which prefer the
‘signiﬁcant lessening of competition’ (SLC) test, Ireland and the United Kingdom,
having each come to it only in 2002,26 show no enthusiasm to depart from it. (And
whilst on this detour it is also worth noting, for it has no natural home elsewhere in this
comment, that Portugal has adopted a comprehensive new competition law, bringing
Portuguese law into close alignment with Union law.27)
3. State aid
The Commission continues to scrutinize new aids swiftly and generously, and not only
under Article 107(3)(c) (facilitating the development of certain economic activities or
regions) but Article 107(3)(b) (remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a
member state),28 a category more malleable and previously available only sparingly. It
has set out parameters on its approach to guarantees covering the liabilities,
recapitalization, controlled winding up of, and other forms of liquidity assistance to,
ﬁnancial institutions, so long as ‘undue distortions’ to competition are avoided, and has
adopted a number of ‘temporary’ communications as an aid to the (gentle) application
of the state aid rules in favour of banks and ﬁnancial institutions reeling from the
ﬁnancial crisis, on:
. the application of state aid rules to measures taken in relation to ﬁnancial institutions
in the context of the current global ﬁnancial crisis (the Banking Communication);29
. recapitalization of ﬁnancial institutions in the current ﬁnancial crisis: limitation of
the aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of
competition (the Recapitalisation Communication);30
. the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (the Impaired
Asset Communication);31 and
. the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the ﬁnancial
sector in the current crisis (the Restructuring Communication).32
There is also a temporary framework for state aid measures to support access to ﬁnance
in the current ﬁnancial and economic crisis,33 revised in 2011,34 and another to support
measures, from January 2012, in favour of banks in the context of the ﬁnancial and
sovereign debt crises.35
24 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung vom 28. März 2012, Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des
GWB (8. GWB-Novelle); see the proposed § 36 I GWB.
25 Stellungnahme des Bundeskartellamts zum Regierungsentwurf zur 8. GWB-Novelle vom
22. Juni 2012.
26 Respectively, Competition Act, 2002, s 22(3); Enterprise Act 2002, ss 35, 36. Previously the
tests had been the far woollier contrary to the common good or against the public interest.
27 Lei n.o 19/2012 de 8 de maio 2012 aprova o novo regime jurídico da concorrência, Diário da
República, 1.a série—N.o 89—8 de maio de 2012; in force 7 July 2012.
28 See Communication from the Commission—The application of State aid rules to measures
taken in relation to ﬁnancial institutions in the context of the current global ﬁnancial crisis, OJ 2008
C270/8, para 9. 29 OJ 2008 C270/8. 30 OJ 2009 C10/2.
31 OJ 2009 C72/1. 32 OJ 2009 C195/9.
33 OJ 2009 C83/1.
34 OJ 2011 C6/5. See also the Commission Staﬀ Paper, The Eﬀects of temporary State aid rules
adopted in the context of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, SEC(2011) 1126 ﬁnal.
35 OJ 2011 C356/7.
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Aid to the ﬁnancial sector is now generally reckoned to be about E1.6 billion (sic).
As regards state aid more generally, in Spring 2012 the Commission adopted a
communication on state aid modernisation (SAM),36 intending to draw the state aid
regime more eﬀectively (‘actively and positively’) into the Europe 2020 programme.
The three ‘pillars’ of the initiative are more focused and better-quality aid,
simpliﬁcation, and shifting of the focus to a more structured policy approach. As a
ﬁrst step it has launched a review of the (four-year-old) general block exemption
regulation (GBER)37 with a view to proposing a revised version in 2013.
B. Services of General Economic Interest
In 2005 the Commission adopted a decision (under Article 106(3)) on the application of
Article 106 to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to
undertakings providing services of general economic interest (SGEIs).38 It was replaced
in early 2012 with a new comprehensive ‘package’ on the application of state aid rules
to SGEIs.39 Exempted from any obligation to notify is subvention for the running of
social services, more speciﬁcally health and long-term care, childcare, access to and
reintegration in the labour market, social housing and the care and social inclusion of
vulnerable groups.40 Other services (other than transport and transport infrastructure)
receiving public compensation are exempted up to a cap of E15 million per year.41 A
communication sets out the manner in which the Commission will analyse cases falling
outwith the decision and notiﬁed to it.42 The ﬁnal element of the package is a de minimis
regulation for SGEIs, exempting from the prohibition of Article 107 subvention of up to
E500,000 over a given three-year period.43
C. Enforcement
1. Commission enforcement
Fines imposed under Regulation 1/2003 are still nominally administrative, not criminal,
penalties,44 but this is a view coming increasingly under serious challenge.45 Even the
Court of Justice is wavering: Advocate-General Kokott ﬁnds the enforcement
36 COM(2012) 209 ﬁnal. 37 Regulation 800/2008 OJ 2008 L214/3.
38 Decision 2005/842 OJ 2005 L312/67. The decision was more of the nature of a block
exemption (see immediately below) and so arguably improperly adopted under art 106(3).
39 Decision 2012/21 OJ 2012 L7/3 on the application of Article 106(2) of the TFEU to State aid
in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the
operation of SGEIs; also Communication on the application of European Union State aid rules to
compensation granted for the provision of SGEIs, OJ 2012 C8/4.
40 Decision 2012/21, ibid., arts 2, 3.
41 Decision 1/2003, arts 2(1)(a), 3.
42 European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation, OJ
2012 C8/15.
43 Regulation 360/2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU to de minimis
aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest, OJ 2012 L114/8.
44 Art 23(5); conﬁrmed by the Court of Justice in Case 45/69 Boehringer Mannheim v
Commission [1970] ECR 769.
45 See eg I. Forrester, ‘A Challenge for Europe’s Judges: The Review of Fines in Competition
Cases’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 185.
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mechanisms of Regulation 1/2003 combined with the severity of ﬁnes which may be
imposed to be ‘an issue which is time and again the subject of discussion and currently
. . . of increasing attention’46 and believes the Union regime of sanctions to mean that
‘the area is at least akin to criminal law’,47 whilst Advocate-General Sharpston speaks
of the ‘de facto’ and ‘ongoing’ ‘‘‘criminalisation’’ of competition law’.48 In all cases
it has ramiﬁcations for the procedural safeguards aﬀorded by Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, but which sets stricter standards in the criminal arena.
However, as Ms Sharpston allows, ‘[t]he requirements a system of judicial review
must meet to comply with Article 6(1) ECHR have yet to be fully clariﬁed, but it is
uncertain whether the existing system of EU competition law enforcement, including
judicial review, meets those requirements’.49 With Lisbon the Union is required to
accede to the Convention,50 and perhaps with this in mind there is now before the
Court a number of challenges to the machinery and review of Commission ﬁnes.
According to the Court of Human Rights Article 6 requires the Union judicature to
exercise ‘full jurisdiction, including the power to quash in all respects, on questions of
fact and of law, the challenged decision’.51 This it does vigorously in other contexts,52
and there is no question it has the power to do so under Article 261 TFEU and
Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 (at least where a decision has imposed a ﬁne or a
periodic penalty payment), but there are doubts as to whether it discharges this
jurisdiction adequately. Given the Union’s judicial architecture it is a task which falls
primarily to the General Court; but that Court’s articulation of its proper role in
Microsoft53 is one which seems to fall short of the mark. There were hopes in some
quarters that the Court of Justice would take a robust stand in the KME cases54 and in
Chalkor55 but they were dashed in late 2011, the Court ﬁnding no aﬀront in Union
procedure to the right to eﬀective judicial review and, implicitly, to Article 6 ECHR.
Recent indications from Strasbourg suggest the Court of Human Rights might not, now,
disagree.56 There remain other high-proﬁle cases in the pipeline,57 but it is diﬃcult to
see how the General Court can now, even were it minded to do so, say otherwise.
46 Cases C-628/10 & 14/11P Alliance One International and ors v Commission, pending, at
para 95 of her opinion.
47 Case C-97/08P Akzo Nobel and ors v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237, at para 39 of her
opinion (‘es sich um einen dem Strafrecht zumindest verwandten Bereich handelt’).
48 Case C-272/09P KME Germany and ors v Commission, judgment of 8 December 2011, not
yet reported, at paras 46 and 51 of her opinion.
49 At para 51 of her opinion. 50 TEU, art 6(2).
51 Janosevic v Sweden (2004) 38 EHRR 22, at para 81; expressly recognized by the General
Court in Case T-138/07 Schindler Holding Ltd and ors v Commission, judgment of 13 July 2011,
not yet reported, at paras 56, 107.
52 See the robust language of the General Court in Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission (Kadi III)
[2010] ECR II-5177.
53 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, at paras 87–88; the approach
reconﬁrmed in Case T-301/04 Clearstream Banking & Clearstream International v Commission
[2009] ECR II-3155, at paras 93–95.
54 Case C-272/09P KME Germany, fn 48 above; Case C-389/10P KME Germany and ors v
Commission, judgment of 8 December 2011, not yet reported.
55 Case C-386/10P Chalkor Epexergasias Metallon v Commission, judgment of 8 December
2011, not yet reported.
56 Menarini Diagnostics v Italy (Application no 43509/08), judgment of 27 September 2011,
not yet reported. Cf the earlier Société Stenuit v France (1992) 14 EHRR 509; Dubus v France
(Application No 5242/04), judgment of 11 June 2009, not yet reported.
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Yet the matter is not closed. Here is Advocate-General Bot, in an appeal against a
judgment of the General Court conﬁrming a ﬁne of E38 million imposed upon E.ON
for breaking a seal in the course of a Commission investigation:58
‘I am inclined to think that the General Court did not fully exercise its unlimited jurisdiction.
Indeed, I consider that the Court should not have merely asserted . . . that ‘contrary to what
the applicant maintains, a ﬁne of EUR 38 million cannot be regarded as disproportionate to
the infringement, in the light of the particularly serious nature of a breach of seal, the size of
the applicant and the need to ensure that the ﬁne has a suﬃciently deterrent eﬀect’.
Although [that assertion] must obviously be read in the light of [previous] paragraphs, the
fact remains that the Court did not, in my opinion, act like an appeal court examining and
taking possession of the case as from the beginning, as required by Article 6 ECHR.
First of all, I think that the General Court’s appraisal was not suﬃciently independent of
that of the Commission.
In the present case, the question was whether the ﬁne of EUR 38 million imposed by the
Commission was a just penalty for the appellant’s alleged conduct. Did a ﬁne of that amount
make it possible to penalise the applicant’s unlawful conduct eﬀectively, in a manner which
is not negligible and which remains suﬃciently deterrent? On that point I have a feeling that
the General Court did not form its own opinion, relying on the amount ﬁxed in a rather
general way by the Commission.’59
and so recommends that the judgment be set aside and the case remitted back to the
General Court for proper (‘unlimited jurisdiction’) consideration. If the Court follows
him it could re-open the issues of the eﬀective (Article 6) judicial protection in the
matter of ﬁnes, if not of the procedures of Regulation 1/2003 more generally.
2. Settlement
The settlement procedure introduced in 2008,60 providing for settlement of cartel cases
through a simpliﬁed procedure involving acknowledgement of cartel involvement and
liability for it in return for a 10 per cent reduction in a ﬁne, was used for the ﬁrst time in
201061 and, as of June 2012,62 has been used six times. Settlement can be reached in a
‘hybrid’ case, involving settlement with some but not all undertakings.63
3. Block exemption
The year 2010 saw the natural death of almost all the block exemptions in force and
their replacement. The insurance block exemption was replaced,64 as were the motor
vehicle block exemption65 and the ‘horizontal’ block exemptions on research and
57 Case T-56/09 Saint-Gobain Glass and ors v Commission and Case T-286/09 Intel v
Commission, both pending.
58 Case COMP/39.326 (E.ON Energie), decision of 30 January 2008, unpublished, upheld in
Case T-141/08 E.ON Energie v Commission, judgment of 15 December 2010, not yet reported.
59 Case C-89/11P E.ON Energie v Commission, pending, at paras 116–120 of his opinion
(delivered 21 June 2012). 60 Regulation 622/2008 OJ 2008 L171/3.
61 Case COMP/38.511 (DRAMS cartel), OJ 2011 C180/15 (summary publication).
62 Case COMP/39.611 (Water management products cartel), decision of 27 June 2012.
63 Case COMP/38.866 (Animal feed phosphates cartel), OJ 2011 C111/19 (summary
publication).
64 Regulation 267/2010 OJ 2010 L83/1. See also Communication from the Commission on the
application of Article 101(3) of the TFEU to the insurance sector, OJ 2010 C82/2.
65 Regulation 461/2010 OJ 2010 L129/52. Also Supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints
in the sale, repair and distribution for motor vehicles, OJ 2010 C135/8.
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development and specialization agreements.66 Of widest application and interest, a new
vertical agreements block exemption applies from June 2010 (until June 2022).67 None
of them marked a signiﬁcant change in style, that having occurred with their
predecessors and the incorporation of a ‘more economic approach’ which marked
them out from their own predecessors. The exercise was thus one more of renewal than
of replacement. One signiﬁcant change in the vertical agreements block exemption, the
exclusion of its beneﬁts to suppliers with greater than a 30 per cent market share is
extended to apply equally to buyers,68 whereas previously this was so only for
agreements containing exclusive supply obligations.69 This is of course recognition that
a buyer may also have and exert market power. The previous extension of exemption to
non-reciprocal vertical agreements between competing undertakings on condition that
the buyer has a total annual turnover not exceeding E100 million70 has disappeared.
There is also recognition that the regulation must apply to online sales,71 which have the
capacity to imperil the integrity of traditional selective (and exclusive) distribution
systems, they traditionally turning signiﬁcantly upon geographic contract territory. This
has now been considered in detail by the Court of Justice.72
The 2004 technology transfer block exemption73 is scheduled to expire in Spring
2014; at the end of 2011 the Commission initiated a public consultation in order to air
suggestions for its amendment and renewal.
4. Decentralization
Following the 2005 Green Paper74 and the 2008 White Paper75 the Commission
continues to champion the cause of private enforcement, but sotto voce. The 2009
‘phantom’ directive on actions for damages,76 surfacing in the sunset of Mrs Kroes’s
term as Commissioner for competition, sunk without a trace. It was in any event a damp
squib77 and failed to address a number of questions now coming to the fore.
In particular the Court of Justice has opened a can of worms in Pﬂeiderer.78 In
2008 the Bundeskartellamt imposed signiﬁcant ﬁnes upon a number of décor paper
manufacturers for price ﬁxing and capacity closure agreements contrary to both
Article 101 TFEU and § 1 GWB.79 Having purchased more than E60 million worth of
paper and other items from the cartel, Pﬂeiderer AG launched a civil claim for damages,
66 Regulation 1217/2010 OJ 2010 L335/36 and Regulation 1218/2010 OJ 2010 L335/43
respectively. Also Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101(3) of the TFEU to horizontal
cooperation agreements, OJ 2010 C11/1 (applicable to both).
67 Regulation 330/2010 OJ 2010 L102/1. Also the (very useful) Guidelines on vertical
restraints, OJ 2010 C130/1. 68 Regulation 330/2010, art 3(1).
69 Regulation 2790/1999 OJ 1999 L336/21, art 3(1). 70 Art 2(4)(a).
71 See the Guidelines on vertical restraints, paras 51–55.
72 Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique v Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence
and anor, judgment of 13 October 2011, not yet reported.
73 Regulation 772/2004 OJ 2004 L123/11.
74 Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 ﬁnal.
75 Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 ﬁnal.
76 Proposal for a Council Directive on rules governing actions for damages for infringements of
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, unpublished.
77 See discussion in [2010] 59 ICLQ 489.
78 Case C-360/09 Pﬂeiderer v Bundeskartellamt, judgment of 14 June 2011, not yet reported.
79 Bundeskartellamt, Entscheidung vom 21. Januar 2008 (Dekorpapier); Pressemeldung vom
5. Februar 2008.
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in the course of which it applied to the Bundeskartellamt for full access to its ﬁle,
including documents submitted to it under the (German) leniency programme. The
Bundeskartellamt refused, a decision challenged by Pﬂeiderer in the Amtsgericht Bonn.
Referred to it under Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice said that the Commission
leniency programme had no binding eﬀect upon national courts, the matter was not
covered by EU rules, the eﬀectiveness of the leniency programme could be undermined
if documents were to be disclosed to prospective damage claimants for the cartelist
would thus be deterred from engaging and cooperating with the competent
administrative authorities, but a right to damages was well established Union law
which is itself a powerful deterrent to anticompetitive behaviour, and so it was for the
national courts to determine whether leniency documents ought to be disclosed,
weighing up these various interests.
The judgment raises complex problems for the coexistence of leniency and civil
action, or, put otherwise, public and private enforcement of the competition rules.
Certainly it may have a chilling eﬀect upon the (considerable) success of the
Commission’s leniency programme, a cartelist likely to be wary of seeking (or
assisting) leniency if the documentation and information it supplies becomes easily
available to any party injured by the cartel, so leading to liability in damages which may
many times outstrip the costs of an administrative ﬁne. At the least it is likely very
carefully to sift any information it provides, and may be less than frank and forthright
with the more inculpatory material. And, like many of the problems with civil
enforcement, it is likely to lead to variations fromMember State to Member State: in the
event the Amtsgericht decided against disclosure,80 but in a follow-on claim in the UK
under Section 47A of the Competition Act stemming from the gas insulated switchgear
cartel,81 Mr Justice Roth in the High Court found the Pﬂeiderer rule to apply to the
Commission as well as national leniency programmes and, applying it, ordered
disclosure of a number of leniency documents in the defendants’ possession.82 The
issue is again before the Court in a reference from the Oberlandesgericht in Vienna,83
and it may wish to take the opportunity to provide greater clarity if not security. It is
worth noting a Hungarian solution to the problem, whereby any party granted immunity
under the leniency programme gains also immunity from civil liability, the liability
borne by other parties to the cartel.84
In fact the whole body of Union law on conﬁdentiality of documents is in a state of
confusion and ﬂux. The Union rule on the privilege adhering to lawyer–client
communications dates from the AM&S judgment in 1982,85 conferring the beneﬁt of
conﬁdentiality only upon ‘outside’ legal advice, and not upon communications from
‘enrolled in house lawyers’86 within a ﬁrm’s legal department. It being a rule distilled
from the principles applying generally throughout the Member States, this was an
80 Amtsgericht Bonn, 18. Januar 2012 (Pﬂeiderer II), EuZW 2012, 193.
81 Case COMP/38.889 OJ 2008 C5/7 (summary publication).
82 National Grid Electricity Transmission plc v ABB Ltd and ors [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch),
[2012] All ER (D) 92.
83 Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie and ors, pending.
84 1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról
(as amended by 2009. évi XIV. törvény), 88/D. §.
85 Case 155/79 AM&S Europe v Commission [1982] ECR 1575.
86 Case C-550/07P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and anor v Commission [2010] ECR I-8301, per
A-G Kokott at para 1 of her opinion (‘abhängig beschäftigter Syndikusanwalt’).
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uncommonly narrow construction. The Court had the opportunity of altering it in Akzo
Nobel Chemicals87 but despite spirited urging to do so it declined, the reasoning being88
that the in-house lawyer does not enjoy the same degree of independence from his or her
employer and is less able to deal eﬀectively with conﬂicts between professional
obligations and employer’s interests. It is not certain this view could withstand a
challenge under the European Convention. The Court is traditionally far more generous
with the Union institutions, ﬁnding that public policy requires the advice of their legal
services to be aﬀorded conﬁdentiality, even to the extent that the advice of the Council
legal service, obtained unoﬃcially by an applicant, must be removed from the case ﬁle
and any direct reference to it deleted from the application.89 But the mood is changing,
perhaps a function of the new (Lisbon) commitment to transparency and openness.90
An undertaking dissatisﬁed with a Commission decision taken under the merger
regulation has a right of access to neither documents relating to the administrative
procedure in the course of the Commission investigation nor to the opinion of the legal
service.91 However, on the same day the Court said, also in a merger case, that the
opinion of the legal service does not enjoy immunity from disclosure where all issues
of the case have become res judicata.92 As a general rule advice to the Commission
from its legal service is not necessarily privileged and the Commission must make the
case that it meets the necessary tests if it wishes to withhold it.93 Nor is authorization of
a Member State necessary for the Commission to allow access to documents produced
by the Member State in the course of enforcement proceedings (under Article 258
TFEU) which have been closed.94 Of especial relevance to civil enforcement of the
competition rules, the interests of a cartelist in avoiding follow-on civil damages claims
does not constitute a legitimate commercial interest meriting protection from
disclosure.95
In the matter of civil enforcement generally the Member States will, in the absence of
ﬁrmer direction, be obliged to go their own way. A few recent examples: the collective
redress favoured by the Commission96 cannot be comfortably accommodated in English
law.97 The passing-on defence is now recognized as legitimate and to be admitted in
German civil procedure.98 As for quantiﬁcation of injury, the Hungarians have
introduced legislation whereby, if a hardcore cartel agreement is shown to exist, there is
a presumption, which may be rebutted by proof to the contrary, that the infringement
increased prices by a factor of 10 per cent;99 the UK government proposes following
87 Case C-550/07P Akzo Nobel Chemicals, ibid. 88 At para 45.
89 Case T-18/10R Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament & Council [2010] ECR II-75*.
90 See TEU, art 1, 2nd para; TFEU, art 15.
91 Case C-404/10P Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, judgment of 28 June 2012, not yet
reported.
92 Case C-477/10P Commission v Agrofert Holdings, judgment of 28 June 2012, not yet
reported.
93 Case C-506/08P Sweden v MyTravel & Commission, judgment of 21 July 2011, not yet
reported.
94 Case T-59/09 Germany v Commission, judgment of 14 February 2012, not yet reported.
95 Case T-437/08 CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogene
Peroxide) v Commission, judgment of 15 December 2011, not yet reported.
96 See Commission Staﬀ Working Document, Towards a Coherent European Approach to
Collective Redress, SEC(2011) 173 ﬁnal.
97 Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1284, [2011] Ch 345.
98 BGH, 28. Juni 2011 (SD-Papier-Kartell), WuW 2012, 57.
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suit but setting the ﬁgure at 20 per cent.100 The Gerechtshof in Amsterdam found that
Commission ﬁnes imposed under Regulation 1/2003 are not deductible from taxable
proﬁts.101 Pending legislative intervention from the Council and/or Commission this
babel of civil rules and remedies is likely to grow only more diverse and complex.
5. Rights of defence
In 2011 the General Court sustained the Commission in the lift/escalator cartel case
almost completely.102 The judgments have been appealed to the Court of Justice.103 In
the meanwhile the Commission, acting for the Community, had already raised an action
in the Rechtbank van koophandel te Brussel seeking damages from those four
companies (which had installed and serviced lifts and escalators in various of its
buildings around Brussels) of E7,061,688. It raises not only the constitutional issue of
who acts for the Community/Union in civil proceedings104 but, in the competition
sphere, knotty issues of (presumed) Commission reliance in a private action upon
information it had itself gathered in the course of an investigation (in principle to be
used only ‘for the purpose for which it was acquired’),105 of judicial independence
protected by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of the principle of
equality of arms in civil proceedings, the latter one recognized by both the European
Convention106 and Union law.107 The Rechtbank has referred these issues to the Court
of Justice108 which aﬀords it the opportunity of ﬁxing more ﬁrmly the rights of defence
in the competition constellation. In the meantime, the Ombudsman found errors in the
99 1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról
(as amended by 2009. évi XIV. törvény), 88/C. §.
100 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Private Actions in Competition Law:
A Consultation on Options for Reform, April 2012, paras 4.40–4.43.
101 Gerechtshof te Amsterdam, kenmerk 06/00252, uitspraak van 11 maart 2010, which
followed loyally the submissions made by the Commission to it under art 15(3) of Regulation
1/2003.
102 Case T-138/07 Schindler Holding Ltd and ors v Commission, Cases T-141 etc/07 General
Technic-Otis and ors v Commission, Case T-144 etc/07 ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs and ors v
Commission and Case T-151/07 Kone and ors v Commission, judgments of 13 July 2011, not yet
reported. The Court reduced the ﬁnes within the ThyssenKrupp Group by between 1 and 40 per
cent for the Commission misapplying an increase in ﬁne for recidivism to members of the group.
103 Cases C-493, 494, 501, 504, 505, 506, 510, 516 and 519/11P, pending.
104 The general rule is that the Commission acts for the Community/Union in legal proceedings
in which the latter’s interests are in issue except in matters relating to the operation of an institution,
in which case, owing to a principle of administrative and operational autonomy, the institution acts
for itself (TFEU, art 335 (ex art 282 EC)). The latter proviso was added by Lisbon, prior to which
authority was required to be delegated by the Commission, as to which see Case C-137/10
European Communities v Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, judgment of 5 May 2011, not yet reported.
Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L1/1, Art. 23(1)(e).
105 Regulation 1/2003, art 28(1). An exception is made for (‘without prejudice to’) the
transmission from the Commission of information in its possession relevant to matters before a
requesting national court (art 15) but this does not solve the problem of the Commission’s direct
interest in the case.
106 Eg, Kress v France (Application no 39594/98), judgment of 7 June 2001, 2001-VI.
107 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-3816, esp at para 66; Case C-404/07 Katz v
Sós [2008] ECR I-7607.
108 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap (optredend via de Europese Commissie) v Otis and
ors, pending.
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Commission’s investigation in the Intel case109 amounting to maladministration110 but
made no ﬁnding as to whether it infringed Intel’s rights of defence. Doubtless that will
be aired before the General Court.
6. Criminal enforcement
The momentum in enforcement of competition law by means of criminal sanctions has
stalled. Following successful prosecutions in Ireland for price ﬁxing by Ford111 and
Citroën112 motor dealers, the last prosecution in the Galway heating oil cartel concluded
in May 2012, the accused (individual) convicted and sentenced to a term of two years’
imprisonment (suspended) and a ﬁne of E30,000.113 Otherwise the Irish courts are
resting. In the United Kingdom, following ﬁrst convictions secured (albeit following
guilty pleas) and custodial sentences imposed for commission of a cartel oﬀence under
Section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002 in Whittle,114 the criminal guns of the Oﬃce of
Fair Trading were brought to bear upon four British Airways executives following its
transatlantic price ﬁxing cartel in fuel surcharges with Virgin Atlantic, for which BA
was ﬁned £121.5 million by the Oﬃce of Fair Trading (OFT)115 and $300 million by the
US Department of Justice.116 But the criminal trial collapsed spectacularly in Spring
2010, the OFT prosecutors having failed in the rudimentary duty to disclose key
documents to the defence and having, perhaps, relied overmuch upon the evidence
supplied by Virgin in exchange for immunity. The OFT subsequently more than halved
the ﬁne it had imposed (which BA had not challenged) to £58.5 million ‘in light of
subsequent cooperation’, which is as much an admission of its own mishandling of the
case and perhaps also recognition of the disapproval it meets frequently for the
Competition Appeal Tribunal in the matter of penalties. It raises serious questions about
the OFT’s competence as a criminal prosecutor, and maybe the very legitimacy of the
cartel oﬀence. As the OFT retires to lick its wounds it is thought unlikely to raise further
criminal proceedings in their present guise—it has not touched the air freight cartel
notwithstanding a Commission ﬁne of E799.4 million,117 a settlement with the
American Department of Justice by BA of a class action claim for $89.5 million, and its
Heathrow-based senior manager for cargo sales and marketing (Mr Keith Packer) ﬁned
$20,000 and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment in a Florida prison118—and the
threat of imprisonment for would-be cartelists, and its deterrent eﬀect, are thus lifted.
109 Case COMP/37.990 (Intel), OJ 2009 C227/13 (summary publication), under review as Case
T-286/09 Intel v Commission, pending.
110 Case 1935/2008/FOR, decision of 14 July 2009.
111 DPP v Manning, judgment of the Central Criminal Court of 9 February 2007, unreported.
112 See inter alia DPP v Durrigan & Doran, guilty pleas in circuit criminal court in May and
October 2008; DPP v Duﬀy [2009] IEHC 208.
113 DPP v Hegarty, judgment of Galway Circuit Court of 2 May 2012, not yet reported.
114 R v Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA 2560, [2008] All ER (D) 133; discussed in
previous comment at (2010) 59 ICLQ 489.
115 OFT, decision of 1 August 2007 (BA/Virgin Atlantic), not yet published.
116 See United States v British Airways, plea agreement in the District Court, District of
Columbia of 23 August 2007.
117 Case COMP/39.258, decision of 9 November 2010; under review as Cases T-36 etc/11
Japanese Air Lines and ors v Commission, pending.
118 United States of America v Packer, plea agreement in the District Court for the District of
Columbia of 7 November 2008.
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However, the cartel oﬀence may acquire a new lease of life. Since its creation it is a
statutory requirement that a constituent component of the oﬀence is one of ‘dishonesty’,
recognized by the Court of Appeal as a diﬃcult and ‘plainly very signiﬁcant’ hurdle.119
The UK government proposes now to drop the requirement.120 It was suggested from
some quarters that another qualiﬁer—the ‘secret’ cartel or the ‘furtive’ cartel—ought to
take its place, but the government seems resolved simply to remove it entirely. If it does
so, it cannot but make the securing of a conviction signiﬁcantly easier. At the same time
the OFT took another drubbing from the Competition Appeal Tribunal, its ﬁnding of a
‘price matching’ cartel amongst two tobacco companies and ten retailers for which it
imposed a (record) total ﬁne of £225 million,121 set aside for faulty reasoning based
upon inadequate evidence,122 and so requiring the OFT to repay the ﬁnes and leaving it
liable for very substantial costs. This is one more factor leading to the reorganization of
UK competition authorities, the merging the OFT and the Competition Commission
into a single ‘Competition and Markets Authority’ by Spring 2014. It is unlikely we
shall see developments of much signiﬁcance in the UK before then.
D. Microsoft
The Microsoft saga has ﬁnally ground to a close. The original bicephalous breach of
Article 102 found by the Commission in 2004123 was upheld by the General Court in
2007124 and, unexpectedly to many, not appealed. The Commission had imposed in the
initial decision a behavioural remedy, requiring Microsoft to make available its
interoperability information on reasonable terms to interested competitors.125 Taking
the view a year later that Microsoft failed in this obligation, the Commission ordered it
to comply by mid-December 2005, failing which it would become liable for a periodic
penalty payment of E2 million per day.126 For (partial) non-compliance the
Commission six months later ﬁxed the penalty payment at E280.5 million and upped
the ante for continuing disobedience to E3 million per day.127 Finally satisﬁed that
Microsoft complied in October 2007, the Commission ﬁxed a second tranche penalty
payment atE899 million,128 and this was challenged by Microsoft. In what it must hope
is its last Microsoft business for a while, in June 2012 the General Court found for the
Commission essentially throughout.129 Pleas challenging the (alleged) inclarity of the
obligation, errors of calculation of remuneration and innovative technology, reliance
119 IB v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, [2009] All ER (D) 90, at para 27. See also R v
George and ors [2010] EWCA 1148, determining that the oﬀence did not require mutual
dishonesty.
120 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Growth, Competition and the Competition
Regime, March 2012, paras 7.7 – 7.11.
121 OFT, decision of 15 April 2010 (Tobacco), not yet published.
122 Imperial Tobacco Group and ors v OFT [2011] CAT 41, judgment of 12 December 2011,
not yet reported.
123 Decision 2007/53 (Microsoft) OJ 2007 L32/23 (summary publication).
124 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601.
125 Decision 2007/53, art 5.
126 Case COMP/37.792 (Microsoft), decision of 10 November 2005, unpublished.
127 Case COMP/37.792 (Microsoft), decision of 12 July 2006, unpublished.
128 Case COMP/37.792 (Microsoft), decision of 27 February 2008, OJ 2009 C166/20 (summary
publication).
129 Case T-167/08 Microsoft v Commission, judgment of 27 June 2012, not yet reported.
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upon the monitoring trustee’s reports, infringement of rights of defence and excessive
and disproportionate penalties came to naught. Unfortunately (for the onlooker) the
argument could not go to the legality of the behavioural remedy ordered by the
Commission, which had been canvassed (although not fully) in the Court’s order
refusing Microsoft interim relief from those remedies.130 Nor was there discussion of
the diﬀerences between periodic penalty payments under Regulations 17 and 1/2003:
the latter allows a penalty not exceeding 5 per cent of average daily turnovers131 so that
the 488 days addressed in the 2008 decision could have meant a penalty payment, for
Microsoft, of E1.423 thousand million;132 had Regulation 17 still been in force, the
penalty could have been ﬁxed at no higher than E488,000.133 The only crumb for
Microsoft was a ﬁnding that an infelicitous letter sent by the Commission which,
combined with subsequent conduct, led Microsoft reasonably to follow a course of
conduct for which it was now being criticized, so that the Court, in light of its unlimited
jurisdiction in the matter of ﬁnes, knocked E39 million (roughly 4.5 per cent) oﬀ the
ﬁne. It is, ﬁnally, comforting to have recognition from the Court that Articles 101 and
102 ‘are themselves drawn up using imprecise legal concepts, such as distortion of
competition and ‘‘abuse’’ of a dominant position’,134 something the rest of us have
always known.
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130 Case T-201/04R Microsoft v Commission [2004] ECR II-4463.
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132 Case T-167/08 Microsoft, at para 203.
133 Regulation 17/62 JO 1962, p 204, art 16(1).
134 Case T-167/08 Microsoft, at para 91.
* School of Law, University of Edinburgh, rlane@staﬀmail.ed.ac.uk.
Current Developments 1005
